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Abstract 
Background: Most incorrect diagnoses involve at least one cognitive error, of which premature closure is the most 
prevalent. While metacognitive strategies can mitigate premature closure in inexperienced learners, these are 
rarely studied in experienced physicians. Our objective here was to evaluate the effect of analytic information 
processing on diagnostic performance of nephrologists and nephrology residents. 
Methods: We asked nine nephrologists and six nephrology residents at the University of Calgary and Glasgow 
University to diagnose ten nephrology cases. We provided presenting features along with contextual information, 
after which we asked for an initial diagnosis. We then primed participants to use either hypothetico-deductive 
reasoning or scheme-inductive reasoning to analyze the remaining case data and generate a final diagnosis.  
Results: After analyzing initial hypotheses, both nephrologists and residents improved the accuracy of final 
diagnoses (31.1% vs. 65.6%, p < 0.001, and 40.0% vs. 70.0%, p < 0.001, respectively). We found a significant 
interaction between experience and analytic processing strategy (p = 0.02): nephrology residents had significantly 
increased odds of diagnostic success when using scheme-inductive reasoning (odds ratio [95% confidence interval] 
5.69 [1.59, 20.33], p = 0.07), whereas the performance of experienced nephrologists did not differ between 
strategies (odds ratio 0.57 [0.23, 1.39], p = 0.20).  
Discussion: Experienced nephrologists and nephrology residents can improve their performance by analyzing initial 
diagnostic hypotheses. The explanation of the interaction between experience and the effect of different 
reasoning strategies is unclear, but may relate to preferences in reasoning strategy, or the changes in knowledge 
structure with experience.  
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Introduction 
Despite ongoing improvements in physician training 
and healthcare delivery, 10 – 15% of patients are still 
misdiagnosed.
1
 While diagnostic errors often have 
multiple etiologies, faulty cognition is implicated in 
approximately three quarters of all errors.
2
 So why 
are cognitive errors so frequent? 
Diagnosing, and decision-making in general, involves 
two cognitive processes.
3-5
 The first is automatic 
information processing, also referred to as intuition 
or pattern recognition. This requires minimal use of 
working memory, and involves rapid, subconscious 
processing of data that are largely contextual, to 
reach a single diagnosis or a short list of possible 
diagnoses. By contrast, analytic information 
processing involves conscious evaluation of case 
data and potential diagnoses by working memory 
until the best fitting diagnosis is selected. Diagnostic 
error may result from faults in either, or both, of 
these processes, but the most frequent explanation 
is “premature closure”, where a final diagnosis is 
selected before sufficient information has been 
processed.
1
 
If insufficient analytic processing causes diagnostic 
error then further analysis of diagnostic hypotheses 
might improve performance.
6
 This metacognitive 
approach is supported by several studies 
demonstrating mitigation of premature closure and 
improved accuracy of final diagnoses.
7-11
 But further 
analysis does not always improve decision making, 
and the psychology and medical education literature 
is replete with studies demonstrating that analysis 
can result in poorer diagnoses/decisions.
12-14
 This 
equipoise suggests that the effect of analytic 
processing on diagnostic performance may be 
modified by other variables, such as the structure 
and complexity of the content area being studied, 
experience within this content area, and perhaps 
individual preferences of problem solving 
strategies.
5
  
These potential effect modifiers are not 
independent. Complexity is inversely related to 
experience, and problem-solving preferences change 
with experience. Novice learners solve problems by 
first creating mental models from their underlying 
knowledge and perception of the problem, and then 
analyze each model until the best fit is selected.
15,16
 
When studying problem-solving in medicine we 
typically refer to “models” as “diagnostic 
hypotheses”, and replace “model-based reasoning” 
with “hypothetico-deductive reasoning”. With 
experience, this form of reasoning becomes 
increasingly complex as improved knowledge allows 
for a larger number of more elaborate models to be 
generated, thus increasing cognitive load.
15,17
 To 
counter this, more experienced learners abstract 
domain-specific rules and then form rule-based 
schemas to allow them to analyze problems without 
building models, or by building fewer models.
18-20 
In 
theory, adopting “rule-based reasoning” (or 
“scheme-inductive reasoning”) allows for more 
efficient diagnosing. Finally, with further experience 
the role of analytic processing is diminished and 
diagnoses are increasingly made by automatic 
processing alone.
21
 Experienced physicians may be 
afforded the luxury of diagnosing without analysis 
due to improved perception and ability to generate 
accurate initial hypotheses, and/or because they 
have developed mental shortcuts, or “heuristics”, 
whereby they omit or obscure the intermediary 
steps of analytic processing.
22,23
 
Experienced physicians develop heuristics as these 
are more likely to help than hinder diagnostic 
reasoning.
24
 Yet with increasing experience and 
reliance on automatic processing and heuristics, 
physicians are more susceptible to premature 
closure, are less willing to reconsider their 
diagnoses, and, consequently, become progressively 
error prone.
25-27
 If analyzing an initial hypothesis 
improves performance of less experienced learners, 
this may also work for experienced physicians. But 
we should not assume that metacognitive strategies 
are universally beneficial: if we force experienced 
physicians to abandon their preferred reasoning 
strategies and process information like novices they 
may perform like novices!
28
 
In this study our objective was to evaluate the effect 
of analyzing an initial hypothesis on the diagnostic 
performance of practicing physicians. We predicted 
that if analysis is an effective metacognitive strategy 
then performance should improve with analysis. To 
test this hypothesis we manipulated the information 
processing strategies of two groups of physicians 
with differing degrees of experience – practicing 
nephrologists with ten or more years experience in 
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caring for patients with kidney diseases, and 
nephrology subspecialty residents who had 
completed their training in internal medicine and 
were receiving further training in nephrology. After 
providing our participants with a brief clinical 
presentation and contextual information, we asked 
them to commit to an initial diagnosis – knowing 
that this would encourage the use of heuristics and 
risk premature closure. We then asked them to 
reconsider their diagnoses in light of further 
information on the case, and evaluated the impact 
of further analysis on diagnostic performance. 
Cognizant of the different analytic processing 
strategies, we primed our participants to use either 
hypothetico-deductive reasoning or scheme-
inductive reasoning, thus allowing us to compare the 
impact of each strategy on diagnostic performance.  
Methods 
Our study participants were nine practicing 
nephrologists with more than ten years of clinical 
experience in the care of nephrology patients, and 
six nephrology subspecialty residents at the 
University of Calgary or Glasgow University. The 
nephrology subspecialty residents had completed at 
least three years of training in internal medicine and 
were enrolled in nephrology subspecialty training 
programs of two year duration. The Conjoint Medical 
and Research Ethics Board at the University of 
Calgary granted ethical approval for the study and 
each participant provided informed consent prior to 
entry into the study. 
We randomized our participants to receive one of 
two booklets containing ten identical nephrology 
cases in the same order. Each case began with 
primary data that included the presenting complaint 
– which could be a symptom, sign, or abnormal test 
result – along with the patient’s age, gender, 
enabling conditions, and clinical setting. Based upon 
these data alone, we asked our participants to offer 
an initial diagnostic hypothesis. The booklets then 
differed in the reasoning instructions given for each 
case: if group 1 was given instructions to use 
hypothetico-deductive reasoning for case 1 then 
group 2 was instructed to use scheme-inductive 
reasoning (see descriptions of these instructions 
below). Using computer-generated random 
numbers, we randomized the sequence of reasoning 
instructions, and each group answered five 
questions using each reasoning strategy. Cognizant 
that restricting the time available for information 
processing might increase the risk of premature 
closure, we did not limit the time available to 
complete problems. Figure 1 provides an overview 
of our study design. 
Instructions for hypothetico-deductive reasoning 
Instructions on hypothetico-deductive reasoning 
were similar to those used by Mamede et al.
10
 After 
offering an initial diagnostic hypothesis participants 
were asked to list their differential diagnoses. 
Following the presentation of secondary data, they 
were asked to consider, for each diagnosis, features 
consistent with this diagnosis, features inconsistent 
with this diagnosis, and features that would have 
been expected if this were the correct diagnosis. We 
then asked them to rank diagnoses and give their 
final diagnosis. 
Instructions for scheme-inductive reasoning 
After offering an initial diagnostic hypothesis 
participants were asked to draw a diagnostic scheme 
that could be used to help diagnose the cause of this 
clinical presentation. We then asked them to use 
their diagnostic scheme to analyze secondary data 
and provide their final diagnosis. 
Evaluation of diagnostic performance 
The cases used were based upon real patients. For 
each case the final diagnosis was either confirmed 
using the available gold standard, such as histology, 
or two experienced nephrologists (CG & KM) agreed 
upon a single best diagnosis. Participants’ diagnoses 
were considered correct if they matched, or were 
synonymous with, the agreed-upon final diagnosis. 
Statistical Analyses 
We used Fisher’s exact test to compare the 
proportion of correct diagnoses for different degrees 
of clinical experience (experienced nephrologist vs. 
nephrology resident), and reasoning strategies. We 
used McNemar’s discordant pair analysis to compare 
the direction of change (incorrect to correct and vice 
versa) between initial and final diagnoses. 
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Figure 1. Overview of the study design. 
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We used multiple logistic regression to evaluate the 
effect of reasoning strategy and clinical experience 
on diagnostic performance. In our regression model 
we also considered two-variable interaction terms, 
and used backward elimination to remove non-
significant variables from the model. We used STATA 
version 11.0 for our statistical analyses.  
Results 
The effect of analysis on diagnostic performance  
The mean accuracy of initial diagnostic hypotheses 
was 34.7%, and this did not differ between 
experienced nephrologists and nephrology residents 
(p = 0.30). After analysis of the initial hypothesis, 
35% of diagnoses were changed. Of these, the vast 
majority resulted in an incorrect initial hypothesis 
being changed to a correct final diagnosis rather 
than a correct initial hypothesis being changed to an 
incorrect final diagnosis (96% vs. 4%, p < 0.0001). 
The likelihood of changing an initial diagnostic 
hypothesis did not differ between nephrologists and 
residents (p = 0.70), or the information processing 
strategy used (p = 0.90).  
After analyzing their initial diagnostic hypotheses, 
both nephrologists and residents improved the 
accuracy of their final diagnoses (31.1% vs. 65.6%, p 
<0.001, and 40.0% vs. 70.0%, p < 0.001, 
respectively). These data are shown in Figure 2.  
Hypothetico-deductive reasoning vs. scheme-
inductive reasoning 
In our logistic regression model we found a 
significant interaction between clinical experience 
and the effect of different analytic processing 
strategies on diagnostic performance (p < 0.01). 
Stratifying our analysis by clinical experience, we 
found that nephrology residents had significantly 
increased odds of diagnostic success when using 
scheme-inductive reasoning as compared to 
hypothetico-deductive reasoning (odds ratio [95% 
confidence interval] 5.69 [1.59, 20.33], p < 0.01), 
whereas the performance of experienced 
nephrologists did not differ between strategies 
(odds ratio for scheme-inductive reasoning was 0.57 
[0.23, 1.39], p = 0.20). Figure 3 shows the effect of 
the different analytic strategies on diagnostic 
performance.
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Figure 2. The effect on diagnostic performance of analyzing an initial hypothesis  
 
 
Figure 3. The effect on diagnostic performance of hypothetico-deductive reasoning vs. scheme-inductive 
reasoning 
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When we analyzed compliance with priming 
instructions we found that our participants always 
followed the priming instructions for hypothetico-
deductive reasoning, but experienced nephrologists 
failed to generate a diagnostic scheme (or described 
domain-specific rules) for 70% of the cases where 
they were asked to do so. By comparison, the non-
compliance rate with scheme-inductive reasoning 
priming conditions among nephrology residents was 
only 3%. We therefore repeated our analyses based 
upon actual, rather than intended, analytical 
processing strategy used. In this post-hoc analysis 
the effect of analytic reasoning strategy on 
diagnostic performance was unchanged: nephrology 
residents had an increased odds of diagnostic 
success using scheme-inductive reasoning (odds 
ratio 5.15 [1.44, 18.34], p < 0.01), while there was no 
difference in the performance of experienced 
nephrologists (odds ratio 0.65 [0.20, 2.09], p = 0.50). 
Discussion 
This study adds to the growing literature on the 
diagnostic benefits of analytic information 
processing. But rather than evaluating this approach 
in non-physicians or inexperienced trainees, our 
participants were physicians with considerable 
clinical experience – including those who are 
typically considered to be less flexible in their 
diagnostic reasoning strategies, and more prone to 
diagnostic error as a result of premature closure.
25-27
 
The major finding in our study was that both 
experienced nephrologists and residents receiving 
subspecialty training in nephrology improved their 
performance after analyzing their initial diagnostic 
hypotheses. Upon analysis, they rarely substituted 
correct hypotheses with wrong diagnoses, but 
frequently rejected incorrect hypotheses in favour of 
correct diagnoses. Overall, the diagnostic success 
rate approximately doubled after analyzing their 
initial hypotheses.  
The benefits of analytic processing are unlikely to be 
explained by more information processing simply 
being better rather than less. There are too many 
examples of performance declining with over-
analysis to accept this explanation.
12-14
 In almost 
every field of study, experienced practitioners 
become progressively automated in their thoughts 
and actions (or “unconsciously competent”
29
), 
whereas analytic processing involves the use of 
working memory, where the logic of decisions can be 
examined, and their consequences anticipated. 
Studying experienced decision makers in many 
fields, Klein has concluded that experts – as distinct 
from simply experienced practitioners – use 
“recognition-primed decision making” where they 
consciously analyze the consequences of their initial 
decision, and then alter their decisions accordingly.
30
 
Concurring with this, Epstein used the term “mindful 
practice” to describe decision making by expert 
diagnosticians.
31
 These descriptors imply that in the 
minds of experts cognitive processes complement 
each other rather than compete against each other, 
and that analysis is not better than intuition, or vice 
versa.
32
 In our study we did not try to force our 
participants to abandon their heuristics in favour of 
analysis. Rather, we actively encouraged them to use 
these heuristics to generate an early hypothesis – 
after which we provided an opportunity to debias 
their reasoning process by analyzing their initial 
hypothesis in light of further data. Thus, we forced 
our participants to use recognition-primed decision 
making, seemingly to good effect. 
So, if it pays to analyze diagnostic hypotheses, is 
there a better way of doing this? Based upon 
observational studies suggesting that analytic 
processing naturally evolves from hypothetico-
deductive to scheme-inductive reasoning, we 
predicted that scheme-inductive reasoning would be 
a more effective strategy.
18-20
 However, we found a 
significant interaction with experience: nephrology 
residents, but not experienced nephrologists, 
performed better when primed to use scheme-
inductive reasoning.  
The simple explanation for the interaction between 
experience and reasoning strategy is that residents 
prefer scheme-inductive reasoning, while 
experienced nephrologists prefer hypothetico-
deductive reasoning. This is supported by the 
observation that most experienced nephrologists did 
not use scheme-inductive reasoning when primed to 
do so. Unfortunately our study was not designed to 
explain preferences in diagnostic reasoning, but we 
would speculate that each group prefers to do what 
they do on a daily basis. Nephrology residents, by 
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virtue of their mandatory supervision, are forced to 
use analytic processing for each case they see in 
order to justify their diagnosis to the attending 
physician. They have sufficient training in 
nephrology to learn the domain-specific rules, and, 
in addition to a limited number of illness scripts, 
their knowledge structure contains abridged causal 
networks, replete with biomedical knowledge, 
within which domain-specific rules are stored.
33,34
 By 
comparison, experienced nephrologists are not 
forced to articulate the logic behind each diagnostic 
decision, and their knowledge structure is primarily 
composed of illness scripts, within which domain-
specific rules have been encapsulated.
33-35
 Failure to 
use domain-specific rules on a daily basis may make 
them less accessible to experienced nephrologists, 
such that may be easier for them to recall previously 
encountered diagnoses, rather than rules. 
Our study has some limitations. The small number of 
participants limited our power to detect differences 
within and between groups related to the use of 
different analytical reasoning strategies which 
resulted in imprecision and wide confidence 
intervals in our results. We only studied one clinical 
domain, so we cannot extrapolate the benefits of 
analytic processing to other domains. Although 
complex, nephrology problems are usually highly 
structured, and the domain-specific rules are well 
established – which may exaggerate the diagnostic 
benefits of analytic processing.
5
 We cannot assume 
that diagnosing in clinical domains where the rules 
are less clear, for example psychiatry, will also be 
enhanced by analytic processing. Although we 
observed a significant improvement in diagnostic 
performance after analytic processing, 
approximately one third of final diagnoses were 
incorrect. This was despite sufficient data being 
available on each case for the correct final diagnosis 
to be made. This suggests that other cognitive biases 
may have been operating – such as confirmation 
bias, where data supporting, rather than refuting, a 
diagnostic hypothesis, are over emphasized.
6
 More 
than thirty cognitive biases have been identified, so 
no single cognitive strategy is a panacea.
6
 There was 
no control group without a reasoning strategy and so 
we cannot comment on how to participants would 
have performed without a reasoning strategy. This 
was deliberate in our design since without specific 
instructions, there would have been no way of 
accurately determining which reasoning strategy or 
combination of strategies participants would have 
employed. Finally, it is unclear why experienced 
nephrologists failed to use schemes in our study. 
While there are a number of possible explanations 
for this finding, it is impossible for us to accurately 
determine why this is the case. Further studies are 
needed to identify and mitigate other cognitive 
biases.  
Implications for medical education   
If the effect of a given information processing 
strategy on diagnostic performance may be modified 
by other variables, such as content area, experience, 
and individual preferences, making blanket 
recommendations on how to solve clinical problems 
is illogical. Recommendations on how to improve 
performance should target the cause(s) of poor 
performance, of which there are many. Our results 
suggest that for experienced physicians, as for 
novices, if the cognitive problem is premature 
closure, then analysis of initial hypotheses may be a 
cognitive solution. As to how these hypotheses 
should be analyzed, it appears that there is no 
consistently “better” analytic strategy, due to effect 
modification by other variables, such as clinical 
experience.  
Conclusion 
We found that the diagnostic performance of 
experienced nephrologists and nephrology residents 
improved when they combined heuristics with 
analysis of their initial diagnostic hypotheses. The 
effectiveness of the analytical strategy used, 
scheme-inductive vs. hypothetico-deductive 
reasoning, varied with experience – likely due to 
divergent preferences for reasoning strategies, 
which may be related to differences in underlying 
knowledge structure. Although encouraging, our 
results also highlight that there are multiple sources 
of cognitive error, so one cognitive solution will not 
solve all cognitive problems. 
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